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RIGHTS OF FEE SIMPLE OWNER OF SUBJACENT MINERAL
STRATUM IN THE CONTAINING SPACE.-In a recent case"

in equity the bill alleged that the defendant owned
"all the coal, limestone rock, ores, and minerals between the center of the earth and the stratum of cement
rock 9 feet or less in thickness, located about 30 feet above
the Wheeling vein of coal underlying the surface" of the
complainant's land, and that the defendant was, without
the consent of the complaintant, transporting coal from
adjoining lands through passageways formed by mining
said underlying coal. An injunction was requested. A
demurrer to the bill was sustained, and the trial court certified its ruling to the Court of Appeals,. where the ruling
was affirmed. No brief was filed by the complainant. The
court in a brief opinion and without extended discussion
followed the great weight of authority, 2 which is to the
effect, that on a grant or reservation in fee simple of a
stratum of mineral, such as a vein of coal, thus severing
the ownership of such mineral from that of the rest of the
land, the owner of such mineral may make use of the spaces
produced by mining, for the purpose of transporting
through such chambers coal mined on other lands. This
logically follows from the conclusion reached in these
cases that where there is a grant or reservation of subsurface minerals in fee, the parties intend a grant or reservation, not only of the minerals in fee, but also of the space
containing such minerals; hence since the owner of the
mineral vein owns the space in fee simple, he may use it
for the purpose of transporting minerals from other lands.
About five years ago the Supreme Court of Virginia"
ventured to disagree with the then unbroken line of decisions on the question, and took the view that the owner of
the minerals had no right to use said space for purposes
other than those properly connected with the mining of
said minerals. In an article published in the West Virginia
Law Quarterly, 4 the authors contended that the result
reached by the Virginia court was, on principle, preferable
to that of the majority rule; that where the grant or reser1 Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 129 S. E. 311 (W.
2 See collection of cases in 27 W. VA. L. QUAR. 834, n. 7.

Va.

1925).

3 Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., 128 Va. 383, 105 S. E. 117 (1920).
4 The Nature of Property Rights in a Separately Owned mineral Vein, 27 W. VA.
L. QuAm. 332.
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vation of minerals is silent on this point, the intent of the
parties is that title to the minerals only is granted or
reserved, together with such privileges to use the space
containing such minerals as may be necessary for the purpose of mining the minerals, whenever the owner chooses
to mine the same; that the privileges of using the space
therefore are thus limited and terminate as soon as all the
minerals have been removed.
If A, a landowner, grants a specific vein of coal to B in
fee, he probably never dreams that he is granting B a fee
simple estate in the containing space, which estate presumably will endure forever or until retransferred or terminated by some method recognized by law, unless one assumes
that A knows the law and consequently is fully aware of
the legal effect of his conveyance. The mineral is valuable
only because it can be mined and sold, and certainly A
could by appropriate language, even in jurisdictions which
follow the majority rule, convey the mineral in fee together
with the privilege of using the containing space only for
the purpose of removing such mineral. 5 In other words
there is nothing strange in the conception of fee simple
ownership of mineral in place, without the fee simple
ownership of the containing space, nor does there seemto be
any good reason why such an estate cannot be created by
express language. It is submitted that the average reasonable man, not learned in law, when he makes such a grant
as is supposed, thinks he is granting the minerals only, and
would be greatly surprised if he were informed that he was
creating an estate in fee in the space, which would continue
after all the minerals had been removed. The law ought
not to run counter to the reasonable suppositions of ordinary
men who are not learned in law, unless there is some good
policy which makes such a departure desirable. It is submitted then that if ordinary reasonable men would in such
case suppose the grant carried only the minerals with the
privilege of mining them, and not a perpetual estate in fee
in the space containing the minerals, (which space the
owner presumably would be privileged to use for any pure Schobert
solidated

v. Pittsburg Coal Co., 254 I1. 4'74, 98 N. E. 946 (1912)

Coal Co.

v.

Schmisseur,

135

Ill.

371,

26 N.

E.

Indian Camp Coal Co., '75 Oh. St. 493, 80 N. E. 6 (1907)
Sons v. Economy Coal Co., 149 Iowa 24. 127 N.

Ia. 858, 101 N. W. 91 (1904); Rockafellow
(1898).

W.

795

(dictum) ; Con-

(dictum) ; Moore

v.

(dictum) ; Thos. Beck &

1109 (1910) ; Moore v. Price, 125

v. Hanover Coal Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 241

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol32/iss3/6

2

Simonton: Rights of Fee Simple Owner of Subjacent Mineral Stratum in the Co
WEST FIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

pose not inconsistent with the rights of the adjoining
property owners, even after all the minerals had been
removed) this supposition ought to be respected unless
there are sound reasons of policy opposed to it. Are there
such considerations of policy?
The first English cases which involved the right of the
coal owner to transport coal from adjoining lands through
spaces made by mining, merely assumed title to the space
passed for the reason that the grant or reservation of the
coal was absolute, hence it was concluded the parties must
necessarily have intended this result." Was this conclusion
based on any reasonable policy or was it merely the effect
of technical notions as to estates in fee simple? If it really
was based on policy, evidently such considerations were
not sufficiently strong to apply in the case of copyhold
lands for in the case of copyholds the English court came
to the opposite conclusion.7 It Beems evident that our
courts merely followed the English decisions and that our
decisions were very largely the result of the doctrine of
stare deojais.
It has been suggested that the majority rule is based on
public policy-that there is a public interest in the encouragement of the coal industry and that this rule is justified
because it tends to encourage the mining of coal.8 Perhaps
there may be some force in this economic argument, though
it is doubtful. It is improbable that one mine in a hundred
in this country would be adversely affected were the rule
otherwise, and such a small minority probably would not
affect the retail price of coal at all. The majority rule
may indeed aid the hard working coal speculator at times,
by enabling him to secure control of the mineral at a
strategic point, which he may dispose of at a fat profit,
after securing his advantage from some less learned landowner. He may pass along a part of his profit to the
public but one can not help but have doubts. Certainly
there can be no object in encouraging the coal industry
unless beneficial to the public, particularly at the expense
of the landowner. Besides why did not the English courts
apply the same rule to copyholds, and why do not our
See Proud v. Bates, 84 L. J. Ch. 406 (1865).
T For the technical basis of the distinction ns to copybold lands together with
authorities see 27 W, VA. L. QuAR. 384-6.
8 See dissent of Prentis J., in Clayborn Case supra at p. 402.
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courts permit the coal operator to transport coal from
adjoining lands across the surface? The policy here would
be just as strong, and in the latter case far more effective.
Often there would be little or no actual damage to the landowner. It is to be doubted whether even a coal operator's
statistician could make a convincing demonstration of any
benefit to the public resulting from the workings of the
majority rule.9
It has also been suggested that to hold that a grant or
reservation of mineral in fee simple gives a fee simple
estate in the minerals with only incidental privileges of
using the containing space for the purpose of mining such
minerals, would create a new sort of estate unknown to the
common law;1o that there is a sound policy against this,
and then the much discussed and much abused case of
Hill v. Tupper1 is apt to be cited as authority. The writer
has never been able to see how that doctrine, however it
may be stated, or that case, whatever it may hold, can possibly have any application to the question under discussion
here. The question is merely what shall the law assume
the parties mean by a grant or reservation of a mineral
vein in fee simple without any language bearing on the
ownership of the containing spade? It most certainly is
not a question as to whether or not the parties will be
permitted to create an estate in fee in mineral without also
passing fee simple title to the space. No court has ever
suggested this may not be accomplished by express language, and as a matter of fact not only is there authority
12
that such an estate may be created in a mineral vein,
but there are examples of such estates to be found in common law decisions. For example such is the estate created
0 The writer believes there was no merit in the suggestion even fifty years ago,
and at present the difficulty with the soft coal industry is overdevelopment. Such
statements are afterthoughts suggested to justify decisions already made, and such
statements are apt to be without substantial foundation. Besides why should the public
interest be so strong as to justify what is otherwise an 'unjust legal trap for the
landowner? Why should not the coal operator and the public pay for the coal they
get?
"o This is asserted in a note in 31 YALE L. J. 747, 753. It has been said that
Hill v. Tupper holds that a new species of incorporeal hereditament cannot be created.
It is doubtful whether the doctrine of that case has any value whatever in this country
where recording acts are quite generally in force.
But even so, the estate in the case
under consideration is a fee simple estate and not an incorporeal hereditament. It may
well be true that a new type of fee estate cannot be created, for example, one that will
descend to male and female heirs alternately Johnson v. Whiten, 159 Mass. 424 (1893).
but that doctrine obviously has no application here. The conception of ownership of
property which is occupying space owned by another is so very common today it
could only lead to confusion were the courts to deny such possibility.
u 2 Hurl. & C. 121 (1868).
2 See cases cited in n. 5 supra.
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where standing timber is conveyed in fee simple either by
grant or by reservation ;13 or in case of a grant or reservation of a clay, rock or coal stratum on the surface of the
land; or presumably in case of a conveyance of a vein of
coal near the surface where the practical manner of mining
it is by stripping. Certainly in these cases there is a fee
simple interest in the trees, clay, rock or coal with the incidental privileges in the containing space essential to enable
the owner to enjoy his property. In these cases it is probable no mineral owner ever contended he must necessarily
own the space in fee merely because the grant did not
expressly provide the contrary. Why should there be such
a difference merely because the mineral happens to be
far beneath the surface, or in the case of a vein of coal
near the surface, merely because it happens to have
such a roof that it can best be mined by tunnels instead of
by stripping?
While it is improbable that the majority rule results in
any benefit whatever to the public, though it does furnish
a trap into which the unsuspecting landowner is apt to
fall, to the profit of the coal operator, yet it will probably
persist, not because it is a good rule or is based on sound
policy, but because there will probably be no strong demand
for a change. So far the rule has been applied only where
the spaces produced by mining have been used only for
the transportation of coal from adjoining lands. Should a
railroad company some day buy an old mine and lay tracks
through it thus making a tunnel, the courts would probably
refuse to carry the logic of the theory on which the majority rule is based to the extent of allowing the railroad to
use the space without further compensation, and would
probably find some means to compel payment for the privilege.
In the principal case it is only fair to point out that
according to the allegations of the bill the defendant owned
practically everything from the center of the earth up to
a certain point about 30 feet above the Wheeling vein of
coal, and the complainant owned the surface and the
strata down that far. In such case one might well make
a distinction, and reasonably presume that the parties
responsible for the severance in ownership, might well have
u TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY. 2nd. ed. 882-3.
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intended to give to defendant all the space as well as all
the minerals from the stated level downward. Consequently the result reached might be reached even under
the other view suggested above.
James W. Simonton
University of Missouri
Columbia, Mo.
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